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Summary  
Further European integration in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters is at the crossroads. While its JHA sibling – asylum and immigration – was able 
to emancipate itself from the “Third Pillar”, police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters was forced to stay under the Union’s wings. Since their separation enacted by 
the Amsterdam treaty these two policy areas have experienced significantly different 
developments. A comparison elucidates that police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters has done considerably worse and currently suffers from a high degree of incon-
sistencies. Inconsistencies on various levels: 
 
a)  Traditional inconsistencies among legal systems of member states. 
b)  New European inconsistencies emanating from the fragmented participation in 
Schengen structures. 
c)  Institutional inconsistencies resulting from EU pillar structures. 
d)  Conceptual inconsistencies by focusing on security and failing to pay sufficient 
attention and priority to the citizens, civil liberties and fundamental rights.  
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It is the principle of mutual recognition that tries to address the first inconsistency. It 
was conceived as a means to avoid harmonization and to conserve the difference of dif-
ferent legal systems while at the same time allowing for a certain degree of effective 
European cooperation. Experience has shown, however, that it most probably has not 
delivered the expected results. A reassessment of mutual recognition is currently taking 
place. Its results might lead to a more open minded approach towards the continuously 
defied instrument of approximation of laws. 
The Schengen inconsistency - with two Member States voluntarily only partly “in” and 
ten Member States involuntarily “out” - must be ended as soon as possible. The two 
might not be convinced to enter, but for the willing ten every possible effort must be 
made to realize their complete participation. Only this guarantees, e.g. that a genuinely 
European instrument like the European Arrest warrant is not dependent on an unac-
countable international tool like Interpol to be effectively disseminated among EU Mem-
ber States. 
Attempts to avoid the institutional inconsistency have only recently failed. This is regret-
table as a majority of actors, e.g. Member States, Parliament and Commission has been 
prepared and willing to address the undisputed lack of democratic and judicial control 
within the Third Pillar. 
With regard to the conceptual inconsistency, unfortunately there appears to be no sign 
of change. Judicial and practical cooperation in criminal matters is still focusing on “se-
curity”. “Security” and “freedom” are presented as antithetical values that supposedly 
require a balancing procedure. Coercive security, however, cannot be divorced from rule 
of law, civil liberties and fundamental rights. Instead, security must be understood as a 
flanking measure to secure freedom within the rule of law. 
********************************** 
These conclusions will be elaborated in the course of this paper. It presents a compre-
hensive set of answers to the main questions raised by the Select Committee on Home 
Affairs of the House of Commons. 
 
**********************************  
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List of Questions and answers 
1. The current state of progress in developing practical co-operation between member states 
in the JHA field, and future options in this area. 
•  What benefits have accrued so far from practical co-operation between law enforcement 
and judicial authorities? 
1   Answer: To assess the “benefits of practical cooperation between law en-
forcement and judicial authorities” within the context of European JHA 
policies is not an easy task. Statistics are not necessarily available or may 
not provide the whole picture. This is particularly true for statistics deal-
ing with the question to which extent judicial authorities of Member 
States use different possibilities provided by European law.1 Apart from 
this technical problem, the very concept of “benefit” may vary from dif-
ferent points of view: what might be beneficial from a law enforcement’s 
perspective might be highly detrimental to civil liberties and fundamental 
freedoms. 
2  Attention must further be given to the fact that European co-operation in 
police and criminal matters is conceived of different elements: legislative 
instruments that aim to facilitate immediate cooperation between compe-
tent authorities of Member States on one hand and “European” judicial 
and law enforcement bodies on the other hand. A prominent example of 
the first is the framework decision on the European arrest warrant 
(EAW)2. Examples of the latter are Eurojust, Europol and others.3 
3  Having regard of these preliminaries, it is possible to conclude from 
available figures that law enforcement and judicial authorities in Member 
States make more and more use of European instruments. There is a tan-
gible added-value of European cooperation and coordination that is con-
stantly increasing. However, in order to ensure individual procedural 
r i g h t s  w e  c o n s i d e r  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t h at a parallel development allowing - 
among others - for an effective and coordinated cross-border defense 
must finally be instigated.  
4  The number of cases referred to Eurojust by national authorities has risen 
from 202 in the year 2002 to 588 in 2005. The U.K. is among the top five 
users of Eurojust with 39 requests in 2005 after Germany (99), Italy (51) 
and Sweden (40). In 2005 Eurojust organised 73 co-ordination meetings to 
discuss with officials from national authorities the best way to proceed in 
specific cases. In 2004 52 such meetings were held. Taken from a non-
representative Eurojust survey among national authorities the quality 
                                                 
1 A recent Commission communication deals with the lack of data and seeks to develop a coherent fram-
work  on crime and criminal justice, cf. COM (2006) 437 final, 7.8.2006: “Developing a comprehensive 
and coherent EU strategy to measure crime and criminal justice: An EU Action Plan 2006 – 2010”. 
2 Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1. 
3 Note however that Eurojust and Europol are based on different legal acts, cf. § 13.  
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and swiftness of Eurojust’s assistance appeared to be highly satisfactory.4 
These figures, however, merely reflect the law enforcement’s perspective. 
Seen from a more coherent angle it is a considerable setback that there is 
hitherto no legal framework envisaged that would facilitate effective 
cross-border cooperation and coordination for defense lawyers. Existing 
structures are based on private initiatives that are not institutionalized 
and do not guarantee that every suspect who faces international investi-
gations is able to enjoy the benefits of international defense teams. To ad-
dress this shortcoming the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(CCBE) has proposed to establish a European Criminal Law Ombudsman 
whose task not only would be to safeguard the rights of defense but also 
to provide help assembling international defense teams.5 While this pro-
posal is still under discussion and may not be the final answer6, it illus-
trates, however, that there is need to create a European legal framework 
and European structures that allow for equality of arms in criminal pro-
cedures. 
5  It is in particular with Eurojust’s work that the possible problem of “fo-
rum-shopping” must be addressed. What does this indicate? One of Euro-
just’s tasks is to suggest to national authorities which jurisdiction is “in a 
better position” to undertake an investigation or to prosecute specific 
acts.7 In which sense “better position” is to be understood, remains, how-
ever, open to interpretation. It might include that a jurisdiction is “better” 
where legal obstacles like admissibility of evidence or other procedural 
rights are lower. Eurojust itself has addressed this issue quite early and 
has drawn up “Guidelines for deciding which prosecution should prose-
cute”.8 These guidelines establish a presumption that prosecution should 
take place “where the majority of the criminality occurred or where the 
majority of the loss was sustained”. It is also explicitly foreseen that 
“prosecutors must not decide to prosecute in one jurisdiction rather than 
another simply to avoid complying with the legal obligations that apply 
in one jurisdiction but not in another”. Based on these guidelines, the fear 
of “forum-shopping” seems to be banned. However, they are no more 
than internal suggestions without binding legal force. The Eurojust 
Council decision does not explicitly forbid the practice of “forum-
shopping”. It cannot be excluded therefore that under specific circum-
stances, e.g. political pressure to achieve prestigious results, or in the 
course of day-to-day work, distinctions between “law-enforcement 
friendly“ and “defense-friendly” jurisdictions might be drawn and na-
tional authorities accordingly advised. 
                                                 
4 All figures: Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 30 ff. 
5 Proposal by the CCBE for the establishment of a European Criminal Law Ombudsman, December 2004. 
6 Cf. Han Jahae, The European Criminal Law Ombudsman, speech delivered at the ERA Seminar held 7 
April 2006 in Trier, www.ecba.org/cms. 
7 Articles 6 (a) (ii) and 7 (a) (ii) Eurojust Council decision, OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1. 
8 Annex to Eurojust Annual Report 2003.  
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6  With regard to legislative measures it is towards the application of the 
European  arrest  warrant that some figures are available. Numbers for 
2005 comprising 17 Member States were discussed in this year’s June JHA 
Council: from 1.526 people arrested, 1.295 were effectively surrendered 
within 30 to 40 days.9 For the time up to September 2004 - comprising 20 
Member States - 2.603 warrants had been issued with 653 persons ar-
rested and 104 surrendered.10 Concerning the effectiveness of EAWs the 
Commission’s report indicates that the average time to execute a warrant 
had fallen from more than nine months to 43 days. It is important to note 
furthermore that in those cases where the person consents to his surren-
der the average time is only 13 days.11 Consented surrender is frequent 
according to the Commission’s report. This illustrates in our view that 
benefits from practical police and judicial cooperation are highest when a 
consented solution together with the citizen under investigation is 
sought. When measures are coerced, however, swiftness and effectiveness 
suffers considerably.  
•  What are the lessons of practical co-operation for European policy and legislation, and 
how effective is Eurojust in spreading best practice? 
7  Answer: In particular with regard to new European institutions and bod-
ies one quite obvious lesson is that it is often not enough to simply estab-
lish such bodies. In addition Member States’ authorities must be able and 
willing to cooperate and provide necessary information. The reluctance of 
national authorities to pass information, e.g. to Europol is a continuing 
problem that has often been mentioned and criticized.12 
8  National officials must furthermore be aware of the possibilities, instru-
ments and bodies that exist to facilitate European co-operation. However, 
to promote such knowledge cannot be the exclusive responsibility of 
these bodies or EU themselves. It is first and foremost Member States’ 
duty to train and inform their officials. In spite of this, there is done a lot 
at EU level to disseminate relevant knowledge, e.g. by CEPOL, the Euro-
pean Police College in Bramshill, U.K. In 2005 CEPOL organized 56 
courses training a total number of 1.087 officials.13 Eurojust as well is ac-
tive in training and knowledge dissemination. In 2005 it organized seven 
strategic seminars on different issues like terrorism, EAW implementa-
                                                 
9 Press Release 9409/06 (Presse 144), 2732nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 1-
2 June 2006, p. 24. 
10 COM (2006) 8 final, 24.1.2006: “Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedure between 
Member States”, p. 4. 
11 Ibid., p. 5. 
12 Cf. Commission communication COM (2004) 376 final, 18.5.2004: “Enhancing police and customs co-
operation in the European Union”, p. 15. 
13 CEPOL, Annual Report 2005, p. 19.  
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tion, Euro counterfeiting, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings 
and money laundering.14 
9  One lesson that could be learned from the initial difficulties of CEPOL is 
that setting up European bodies without providing them neither with le-
gal personality nor a budget - as the first Council decision of 22 December 
200015 did - makes it rather unlikely that this body will be able to deliver 
the envisaged effects.16 
10  Apart from these more practical lessons, there are two observations that 
aim more directly at legislators. Further developments of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs will be influenced by the answers found to these observa-
tions: 
11  a) European police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters under 
the existing legal framework is dependent on Member States’ willingness 
to implement the necessary measures on national level. It can be ob-
served, however, that Member States’ implementing activities are gener-
ally rather slow and reluctant in spite earlier agreements on binding 
deadlines or invigorated declarations on the urge and necessity of certain 
measures. This observation can be made in relation to nearly every single 
Third Pillar action taken by the Council in the last years.17 A very promi-
nent and sad but by far not the only example is the ratification of three 
protocols amending the 1995 Europol Convention. These protocols date 
back to 2000, 2002 and 2003. Only very recently all Member States suc-
ceeded in ratifying these provisions making it possible, that they enter 
into force in 2007.18 
12  b) The most important lesson, however, is the need to develop a coherent 
understanding of the issues at stake. It is not without deeper meaning 
that the official label of JHA policies on European level, the “Area of free-
dom, security and justice” names “freedom” in the first place and flanks 
“security” with both “freedom” and “justice”. Security cannot be 
achieved without securing fundamental rights and guaranteeing true ju-
dicial control and rule of law. The constitutional difficulties that became 
visible in many Member States in connection with the European arrest 
warrant made this very clear. Further progress must therefore strictly ad-
here to the principles of democratic accountability, judicial control and 
unconditional protection of civil liberties and fundamental rights. As 
                                                 
14 Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 36 – 47. 
15 OJ L 336, 30.12. 2006, p. 1. 
16 Commission communication COM (2004) 376 final, 18.5.2004: “Enhancing police and customs co-
operation in the European Union”, p. 22. 
17 Cf. e.g. Council document 9589/06 ADD 1, 19.5.2006: “Implementation of the Action Plan to combat 
terrorism”, providing lists with the implementation state of play for several legislative instruments consid-
ered urgent. 
18 Cf. Speech delivered by the Europol Director, Max-Peter Ratzel, on the Joint Parliamentary Meeting held 
in Brussels, 2-3 October 2006.  
Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000, Brussels, Belgium 
www.ceps.be 
 
7
could be seen from the German ruling on the EAW19, national constitu-
tional courts are observing European JHA developments very closely and 
with a certain amount of scepticism. EU governments are therefore well 
advised to resist the temptation of misusing current intransparent and 
uncontrolled Third pillar Council structures to realise security focused 
policies that – due to national constitutional limitations – they wouldn’t 
be able to realise at home. 
•  What should be the role of Europol, Interpol and Eurojust in facilitating practical co-
operation? 
13  Answer: Answering this question makes it necessary to recall that Euro-
pol, Interpol and Eurojust are set up by different legal acts and conse-
quently have very distinct features. Interpol, the International Criminal 
Police Organization, is an international organization founded in 1923 
with currently 186 member countries. Europol was established in 1995 by 
an intergovernmental convention20 and up till now stands outside genu-
ine EU structures. Only Eurojust is – from its legal nature – a distinct “EU 
child”, established by a Council decision in 200221. But even Eurojust dif-
fers from other EU bodies and agencies as powers and competences of 
Eurojust staff are unbalanced: national members have different judicial 
powers according to their Member States’ national laws; their salary is 
also paid by Member States.22 
14  Despite their differing legal construction Interpol and Europol have con-
cluded agreements among each other with the aim of increasing effec-
tiveness and avoiding duplication of work. This entails exchange of in-
formation and the exchange of liaison officers. As far as could be seen, 
however, there are no official links between Eurojust and Interpol. This 
seems us to be a major disadvantage taking into account which consider-
able practical role Interpol plays in realizing European judicial coopera-
tion: Interpol currently bridges the gap for fast and effective transmission 
of EAWs via its system.23 This is because not all Member States partici-
pate in the Schengen Information System. Two of the Member States de-
cided to participate only partly but ten - and from 2007 on twelve - Mem-
ber States are kept deliberately out of the system, despite their wishes to 
join. That Interpol - as a consequence - has in effect become an intrinsic 
part of the European system of judicial cooperation is unacceptable. To 
remedy this we consider it necessary that the new Member States must 
have access to the Schengen Information System as soon as possible. 
                                                 
19 Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 18.7.2005, 2 BvR 2236/04. 
20 OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1. 
21 OJ L 63, 6.3.2002, p. 1. 
22 Articles 9 and 33 Eurojust decision. 
23 Cf. Council document 7702/05, 1.4.2005.  
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15  Various links including a cooperation agreement exist between Eurojust 
and Europol. Their roles seem to be clearly defined and distinct. While 
Europol’s task is to improve effectiveness and cooperation of national au-
thorities in „preventing and combating“ certain criminal acts where two 
or more Member States are concerned, Eurojust shall stimulate and im-
prove coordination and cooperation “in the context of investigations and 
prosecutions” of criminal behaviour where two or more Member States 
are concerned. The role of Europol is - so far - characterized by informa-
tion driven police work, while Eurojust follows a more practical ap-
proach, assisting Member States’ authorities in overcoming obstacles in 
cross border investigations and prosecutions, that arise from different le-
gal systems and language. In day-to-day work, however, the lines be-
tween the bodies’ fields of competences seem to be somewhat blurred. It 
cannot be excluded that rivalries exist or arise between Europol and Eu-
rojust This might lead to a situation where information is held back in or-
der to secure visible successes for one of the two actors. Published figures 
indicate that there is in fact much more room for co-operation. Only once 
in the whole year of 2005 did Europol send a request to Eurojust. In the 
other direction - from Eurojust to Europol - there have been 64 requests in 
the same year while only 52 have been answered by Europol.24 
16  Concerning the future role of Interpol, Europol and Eurojust, we are in 
favour of a system that would reflect the distinction between judicial 
tasks and police tasks in Member States’ legal system. Eurojust should 
therefore be empowered to control police activities performed by Euro-
pol, including practical cooperation between Europol and Interpol. 
2. The current state of progress in mutual recognition, including the development of mini-
mum standards, across the EU, and whether further steps in this direction are desirable. 
•  In which areas is mutual recognition currently employed (for example recognition of ju-
dicial judgements in other member states)? 
17  Answer: The principle of mutual recognition traces back to the Cardiff 
European Council on 15 and 16 June 1998. The Tampere European Coun-
cil concluded that mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of 
judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. 
A program of measures to implement this principle was drawn up by the 
Commission and agreed upon by the JHA Council held in Marseille on 28 
and 29 July 2000.25 In criminal matters the principle of mutual recognition 
is the foundation of enacted EU legislation in the following areas: arrest 
warrants26, orders freezing property or evidence27, mutual recognition of 
                                                 
24 Eurojust, Annual Report 2005, p. 19. 
25 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal mat-
ters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, p. 10. 
26 OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1. 
27 OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, p. 45.  
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financial penalties28, exchange of information extracted from criminal re-
cords29. 
18  In October 2006 the JHA Council finally adopted a framework decision 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation 
orders30. It is furthermore foreseen that an agreement on the framework 
decision on mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters will be 
reached in December 200631. 
19  The framework decision on the European evidence warrant32 is still in 
discussion in the Council working groups. Other areas of mutual recogni-
tion that are already addressed or – most likely – will be comprise: a 
European supervision order in pre-trial procedures33, recognition of ear-
lier convictions in the course of new criminal proceedings34, recognitions 
of disqualifications arising from criminal convictions35, the ne bis in idem 
principle36. In a territorial scope, the principle of mutual recognition will 
be “exported” to the Kingdom of Norway and Iceland: an agreement on 
the surrender procedure between EU Member States and these countries 
is currently finalized in the Council working groups.37 
•  How has the principle, including minimum standards and protocols, worked in these ar-
eas? Is it an effective approach, including in terms of cost? 
20  Answer: In order to avoid repetitions we refer to the statistical data given 
in § 6. The figures on the EAW particularly the decrease of lengthy pro-
cedures show that the principle of mutual recognition can contribute to 
speed-up procedures – especially when there is consent of the individual 
– and can hereby reduce costs. However, there are a number of open 
questions and limitations, that we address in §§ 23-26. 
21  Additionally we like to mention that cost efficiency is a particular aspect 
of the Commission’s proposals on the European supervision order. The 
aim of this proposal is to avoid pre-trial detention of suspects that are ar-
                                                 
28 OJ L 76, 22.3.2005, p. 16. 
29 OJ L 322, 9.12.2005, p. 33. 
30 Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 
5-6 October 2006, p. 30. 
31 Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 
5-6 October 2006, p. 21. 
32 Press Release 9409/06 (Presse 144), 2732nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 
1-2 June 2006, p. 9. 
33 Commission proposal, COM (2006) 468 final, 29.8.2006.  
34 Commission proposal, COM (2005) 91 final, 17.3.2005; see also Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 
2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006, p. 24. 
35 Commission communication COM (2006) 73 final, 21.2.2006: “Disqualifications arising from criminal 
convictions in the European Union”. 
36 Commission Green Paper COM (2005) 696 final, 23.12.2005: “On conflicts of jurisdiction and the prin-
ciple of ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings. 
37 Council document 5653/4/06 REV 4, 29.6.2006.  
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rested in a Member State that is not their Member State of residence. In 
this case a detention order is often issued because authorities see a flight 
risk. The European supervision order aims at avoiding such unnecessary 
pre-trial detentions by allowing the suspect to return to his Member State 
of residence and oblige authorities there to ensure that the suspect will 
appear and stay possible court proceedings and/or further investigations. 
With an average pre-trial detention time of 42,5 days in the U.K. and costs 
of 3.039 € per month38 and person, this proposal could help to reduce ex-
penditures and save prison space. 
22  A coherent and European wide application of the principle of ne bis in 
idem, furthermore, is another means that does not only serve the individ-
ual’s right to be only sentenced once for the same wrongdoing but also 
helps to reduce costs: duplicate, cost intensive proceedings in different 
Member States can be avoided. 
•  What are the limitations of mutual recognition as a cornerstone of co-operation, for ex-
ample in cases such as the European Arrest Warrant where there are controversies over 
dual criminality? What have been the successes, and how might these be built on? 
23  Answer: The principle of mutual recognition has always been a compro-
mise solution to enhance cooperation in criminal justice matters without 
the need to harmonise different legal systems. As a “working compro-
mise” it might be characterized as a truly European product. However, as 
it is often the case: solutions that might seem easy, turn out to be more 
problematic. After several years of trying to make the principle of mutual 
recognition work, it seems that it – while delivering some results – even-
tually has caused more difficulties than benefits. This assessment is illus-
trated by a recent Presidency proposal, named: “Follow-up to the mutual 
recognition programme: difficulties in negotiating legislative instruments 
on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and 
possible solutions”39. 
24  Major limitations of the principle are less certain technical intricacies that 
might be solved. Instead the most pressing constraint towards the princi-
ple of mutual recognition is the context in which it stands and is applied.  
Apart from our concerns formulated in § 12, we consider it - particularly 
in the field of criminal substantive and procedural law - indispensable 
that the development of a common judicial area built on the principle of 
mutual recognition is accompanied by measures that guarantee effective 
procedural rights of a suspect. The way Council is and has been dealing 
with the respective Commission’s proposal from April 200440 compro-
mises the entire system with no signals in sight that there will soon be an 
                                                 
38 Commission staff working document SEC (2006) 1079, 29.8.2006, p. 11 and 13 based on official U.K. 
information.  
39 Press release, Finnish Presidency, 4.9.2006. 
40 Commission proposal, COM (2004) 328 final, 28.4.2004.  
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agreement. This despite the fact that in 2001 it was agreed upon that 
“mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of third parties, victims and 
suspects” are an important parameter which determines the principles’ 
effectiveness.41 
25  Furthermore - like in the field of practical police co-operation - effective 
democratic and judicial control as well as accountable and transparent 
legislative procedures are necessary preconditions to develop and main-
tain mutual trust. Without mutual trust, the principle of mutual recogni-
tion is doomed as the latter builds on the first. It is furthermore not 
enough that mutual trust is gained between judicial authorities and their 
officials. In order to realise the common area of freedom, security and jus-
tice trust into each others legal systems that guarantee civil liberties, fun-
damental freedoms and rule of law must exist between the citizens of 
Europe. 
26  The inherent link between mutual recognition, mutual trust and the 
shared commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and the re-
spect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law has 
been seen and established by the Council and the Commission in an early 
phase.42 It seems, however, that this coherent approach and understand-
ing has progressively been abandoned in the last five years. It is these de-
velopments that, in our view, constitute major limitations of mutual rec-
ognition.  
3. The current state of progress in and appetite for harmonising criminal justice systems 
across the EU, and whether further steps in this direction are desirable. 
•  How do proposals for harmonisation of criminal law across member states substantially 
differ from mutual recognition? 
27 Answer: As far as can be seen, there are no European efforts to harmonise 
entire “criminal justice systems” as the heading of this set of questions 
suggests. There are however certain European acts that approximate 
some rules on criminal matters as it is foreseen in articles 29 and 31 (e) 
TEU. Approximation of criminal matters aims to ensure that certain pro-
cedural measures and/or certain substantive rules exist in all Member 
States in order to give effective answers to cross-border crime within the 
common judicial area by trying to close existing gaps. It differs from mu-
tual recognition in so far as it aims at establishing a common set of rules. 
Mutual recognition, however, tries to avoid exactly this, by recognizing 
and accepting existing disparities among Member States’ criminal law 
systems. 
                                                 
41 Cf. p. 11 of the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, p. 10. 
42 Cf. p.10 of the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001, p. 10.  
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28  From a theoretical point of view, approximation of laws seems to be more 
efficient and effective compared to mutual recognition as disparities 
among legal systems might provide certain obstacles to the practical ap-
plication of mutual recognition. However, approximation of laws has of-
ten proven to be difficult. It has involved lengthy discussions and proce-
dures. These discussions have in some cases eventually lead to the setting 
of minimum standards, which open possibilities of downgrading existing 
standards or maintaining existing disparities. 
29  In spite these difficulties, approximation of laws has been the path that 
was chosen in establishing a common asylum and immigration policy. 
Although certain setbacks in this field of policy are undisputable, experi-
ence has shown that Member States are eventually able to achieve results. 
While some approaches to downgrade standards have been undertaken, 
we consider that this should not be the reason to abandon the instrument 
of approximation of laws as such. Several aspects have to be kept in 
mind: 1) Approximation of laws - in contrast to mutual recognition - pro-
vides a clear and certain set of rules. 2) It prevents Member States – even 
in case of minimum standards – to go below these minimum standards. 
Such an effect could be observed lately in connection with the directive 
on family reunification and certain plans of the Netherlands to further re-
strict national laws on family reunification. 3) As all Member States are 
members of the Council of Europe and therefore bound by the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, any 
European legislation is eventually subject to the rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 
30  Concerning approximation of criminal law a considerable amount of 
turmoil has been produced recently by the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) involvement. In case C-176/03 from 13 September 2005 the ECJ has 
annulled a Council framework decision approximating environmental 
criminal law. The ECJ was of the view that article 175 TEC provides the 
Community and not the Union with the competence to adopt measures 
relating to criminal law of Member States. The framework decision ap-
proximating environmental criminal law therefore encroached on this 
Community competence. A second case is currently pending with the 
Commission seeking to get annulled another environmental crime frame-
work decision.43 After the first ECJ judgment the Commission has re-
leased a communication announcing that it revises a large number of ex-
isting approximation acts and that considers that a solution must be 
found in order to guarantee legal certainty.44 Before the ECJ has not de-
livered its judgment it is unlikely that the Council will press forward with 
further approximation measures.45 Until now approximation of laws has 
                                                 
43 Case C-440/05, OJ C 22, 28.1.2006, p. 10. 
44 Commission communication, COM (2005) 583 final/2, 24.11.2005. 
45 Press Release 13068/06 (Presse 258), 2752nd Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 
5-6 October 2006, p. 23  
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been enacted in the following areas: fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payment46, confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumen-
talities and property47, counterfeiting in connection with the introduction 
of the euro48, terrorism49, trafficking in human beings50, unauthorized en-
try, transit and residence51, private-sector corruption52, sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography53, attacks on information systems54, 
ship-source pollution55. A legislative proposal has been tabled dealing 
with ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights56.  
•  Would particular areas benefit from harmonisation on issues such as migration, serious 
crime cases and terrorism, rather than practical co-operation or mutual recognition? 
31  Answer: As preliminaries we would like to recall that “migration” is not 
a crime and that we are astounded about grouping migration in a row 
with “serious crime cases” and “terrorism”. We furthermore like to recall 
that the term “benefit” does depend on the spectator’s view, see § 1.  
32  We think that a common understanding and common definitions of cer-
tain crimes would benefit the whole system. Legal certainty and clarity 
would be gained. The existing legal instruments on mutual recognition 
mainly imply a list of 32 crime descriptions to which certain legal conse-
quences are attached, e.g. no double criminality check. The lack of com-
mon definitions of these crimes, e.g. “computer related crime” or “racism 
and xenophobia” is seen by many as a considerable flaw. We concur with 
this assessment. However, defining criminal acts, implies defining which 
human behaviour is deemed punishable. This, however, is not for gov-
ernments to decide behind closed Council doors, void from parliamen-
tary scrutiny and control. Under the existing Third Pillar rules and pro-
cedures we therefore consider it not beneficial to approximate substantive 
criminal law in a large scale. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 1. 
47 OJ L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1 and OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p. 49. 
48 OJ L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 3. 
49 OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3. 
50 OJ L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 1. 
51 OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 17. 
52 OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 54. 
53 OJ L 13, 20.1.2004. p. 44. 
54 OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, p. 67. 
55 OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 164. Please note: the validity of this framework decision is challenged by the 
Commission in the European Court of Justice, case C-440/05, OJ C 22, 28.1.2006, p. 10. 
56 Commission proposal, COM (2006), 168 final, 26.4.2006.  
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4. The process of decision-making on JHA issues at EU level: in particular, the extent to 
which current difficulties in reaching agreement derive from ‘third pillar’ voting procedure and 
might be remedied by implementation of the passerelle clauses in previous treaties. 
•  What implications might use of the passerelle have for the UK’s legal and judicial sys-
tems? What alternative action might improve decision-making? How can transparency 
and accountability at European level best be extended? 
33  Answer: With the Constitutional Treaty being unlikely to come into force 
within foreseeable time and acknowledging that European police and pe-
nal co-operation has positive effects for the safety of European citizens we 
see - under the existing legal possibilities provided for by TEU and TEC – 
no alternative to reach acceptable levels of transparency, accountability as 
well as democratic and judicial control other than to make use of article 
42 TEU. This view is shared not only by the Commission, the European 
Parliament and nearly all NGO’s working in the field, but also by a con-
siderable number of Member States, not least the current Finnish presi-
dency.57 We consider it therefore regrettable that attempts to make use of 
article 42 TEU were recently blocked, namely by Germany.58 However, 
we like to highlight that our main concern in this context is not about effi-
ciency in terms of speed, but about true accountability, legitimacy and 
control. 
5. How significant is the recent trend towards internal agreements between groups of mem-
ber states outside the framework of the EU, for instance the Schengen countries, or the Prum 
convention? To what extent is this due to unanimity or difficulties in decision making? What are 
the implications for the UK and for EU fragmentation? 
34  Answer:  The trend towards internal agreements between groups of 
Member States in the field of JHA policies is significant in so far as it 
avoids full force of the European Union/Community cooperation. As the 
JHA unit of CEPS has stated earlier in relation to the Prüm treaty but ap-
plicable to other comparable activities, like the G6 meetings in Heilgen-
damm and Stratford-upon-Avon: “The Treaty of Prüm undermines the 
EU’s ability to become an efficient policy-making body in the field of se-
curity. To start with, by setting up exclusive and competitive measures 
that seek to address threats that affect the EU as a whole, it blurs the co-
herence of EU action in these fields. Second, by developing new mecha-
nisms of security that operate above and below the EU level, it dismantles 
trust among Member States. Finally, by establishing a framework whose 
rules are not subject to Parliamentary oversight, the Convention impacts 
on the EU principle of transparency. These three principles – trust, coher-
                                                 
57 Press Release, Finnish Presidency, 22.9.2006: “EU’s operating conditions in matters of justice and home 
affairs must be guaranteed”; see also Commission Communication, COM (2006) 331 final, 
28.6.2006:”Implementing The Hague Programme: the way forward”, p. 13 seq. 
58 Cf. Euractiv. 25.9.2006: “Justice veto left standing post-Tampere”.  
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ency and transparency – are yardsticks agains which Prüm should be as-
sessed”59. 
35  Difficulties in decision making or unanimity do not appear to us as being 
the underlying motivation of these or similar initiatives. If this were the 
case, it would not make any sense why Prüm signatory states have been 
divided over the implementation of the passarelle in September 2006. 
While France, Spain and Luxembourg apparently backed the passarelle 
proposal, Germany – a leading actor in nearly all small JHA circles – 
fiercely opposed it.60 It should be noted that all informal JHA activities 
tend to emphasise that they are in line with EU JHA activities and that 
they aim to strengthen it, however, one gets the impression that the true 
objective is to pre-design JHA co-operation in a smaller extent with the 
aim of importing it later into the European structure. In the light of EU 
Treaty provisions that allow for enhanced cooperation even in the JHA 
field (articles 40, 43 – 45 TEU) one might question not only the political 
wisdom of separate JHA circles but their legality as well.  
6. What are the current developments in the area of common border controls and visa ar-
rangements? Will the proposed changes to the short-stay visa arrangements in relation to the 
eastern neighbours of the EU open up new channels for illegal migration further westward in the 
EU? What are the implications of enlargement for JHA issues, including the impact of labour 
migration and confidence in new member states’ justice systems? 
36  Answer: Recent years have seen efforts to Europeanize and to strengthen 
EU external borders management and visa rules as well as efforts to ease 
some effects of EU enlargement for neighbouring countries. Common 
rules for the movement of persons across borders, the Schengen Borders 
Code61 have been enacted and an agency for the management of opera-
tional cooperation at external borders, Frontex, established62. Standards 
for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents 
have been agreed upon63 as well as a tool to provide exchange of Visa 
data, the Visa Information System64. Proposals have been tabled to estab-
lish a Community Code on Visas65 and a mechanism for the creation of so 
called “Rapid Border Intervention Teams”66. Visible actions are currently 
performed on Europe’s southern maritime borders while their effective-
ness and legality, especially with regard to “interceptions at sea” aiming 
at preventing migrants to reach Europe’s shores allow for some ques-
tions. 
                                                 
59 T. Balzacq, D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild, Security and the Two-Level Game: The Treaty of Prüm, 
the EU and the Management of Threats, CEPS Working Document, No. 134, January 2006, p. 17. 
60 ADNKI.com, 22.9.2006: “EU: Ministers deadlocked over immigration and terrorism”. 
61 OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1. 
62 OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1. 
63 OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1. 
64 OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5. 
65 Commission proposal COM (2006) 403 final, 19.7.2006. 
66 Commission proposal COM (2006) 401 final, 19.7.2006.  
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37  Concerning envisaged visa facilitations for citizens from Russia and 
Ukraine, we do not see any imminent threat that these measures will 
“open up new channels for illegal migration”. Instead we conceive such 
measures as being part of very sensible developments that aim at 
strengthening economic, humanitarian, cultural and scientific ties with 
neighboring countries that will positively influence trade, stability and in-
ter-personal exchange. 
38  Regarding EU enlargement and JHA issues it is possible to observe a 
common more skeptical and less enthusiastic trend. While by 2006 nearly 
all Member States have opened up their labour markets for EU citizens 
from the ten new Member States, only some Member States will allow for 
unrestricted inner-EU-migration with regard to Bulgaria and Romania. 
We like to recall, however, that free movement within the EU is a funda-
mental right and essential part of the whole European project. Therefore: 
limitations to this fundamental right in the form of transitional safeguard-
ing measures are only allowed in exceptional circumstances. We welcome 
that the EU 15 had opened up towards EU 10 much faster than initially 
expected and hope that a similar development will be possible towards 
EU citizens from Bulgaria and Romania. 
39  Safeguarding clauses, however, are not only foreseen for the movement 
of people but may also apply in relation to mutual recognition and other 
principles of JHA policies.67 In its monitoring report on the state of pre-
paredness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania the Commission 
has formulated some criticism with regard to their respective justice sys-
tems.68 Safeguarding JHA measures from the date of accession, however, 
have not been proposed by the Commission. Instead a reporting system 
was instigated with a first report due by 31 March 2007. In some Member 
States, however, e.g. in Germany, there were parliamentary discussions 
dealing with the question if the Government should be officially asked to 
implement and notify JHA safeguarding measures from the date of acces-
sion.69 Such developments highlight again that mutual trust cannot be 
imposed. It must grow, instead, relying on tangible facts and shared fun-
damental principles and values. It is furthermore a strong argument for 
agreeing on common binding principles in JHA issues within the EU in-
stead of trying to cover existing disparities by relying on the principle of 
mutual recognition. 
********************************** 
                                                 
67 Article 38 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the 
adjustments to the treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 157, 21.6.2005, p. 203. 
68 Commission communication, COM (2006) 549 final, 26.9.2006, p. 9. 
69 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Buendnis90/DIE GRUE-
NEN “EU-Beitritt Bulgariens und Rumaeniens zum Erfolg fuehren”, Drucksache 16/3090, 25.10.2006; 
Deutscher Bundestag - 16. Wahlperiode - 60. Sitzung, Berlin, Donnerstag, den 26. Oktober 2006. Plenar-
protokoll 16/60, p. 5850 – 5867. 